Politics and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The suppliers of legislative goods are legislators, and their pristine appearance is to be re-elected. Thus, legislators insufficiency to maximize their chances for re-election, which requires gregarious help. Legislators are productive to be sane and to frame cost-good calculations when faced after a while demands for parliament. However, the legislator’s cost-good calculations are not the cost-benefits to companionship of enacting detail parliament. Instead, the goods are the attached gregarious help the legislator would take from helping parliament and the lost gregarious help they would meet as a outcome of their renewal. When the good to legislators (direct gregarious help) exceeds their costs (privative gregarious help) they gain help parliament. (page 27)
Source: Feldstein, P. (2006). The politics of sanity parliament: An economic perspective (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: Sanity Administration Press.
Review the Resources and reflect on efforts to repeal/replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Consider who goods the most when management is patent clear and in the texture of management implementation.
Post an explication for how you reflect the cost-good anatomy in the announcement from page 27 of Feldstein (2006) abnormal efforts to repeal/replace the ACA. Then, illustrate how analyses such as the one portrayed by the Feldstein announcement may concern decisions by legislative leaders in recommending or positioning common policies (e.g., Congress’ decisions impacting Medicare or Medicaid). APA passage, 3 references